Singapore | When clemency logic falters: A tale of 3 cases

On 14 Aug 2025, Singapore granted clemency to Tristan Tan, commuting his death sentence to life to “reduce disparity” with a co-accused. Yet this disparity arose from opaque prosecutorial discretion, not judicial findings. Meanwhile, clemency was denied to Nagaenthran, who had intellectual disability — exposing troubling inconsistencies in how mercy is applied. 

On 14 August 2025, Singapore’s Cabinet advised President Tharman Shanmugaratnam to commute the death sentence of 33-year-old Tristan Tan Yi Rui to life imprisonment.

Tan had been convicted in February 2023 of trafficking at least 337.6g of methamphetamine — more than 10 times the 25g threshold that presumes trafficking, and well above the 250g threshold that mandates the death penalty unless narrow exceptions apply. 

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), clemency was granted “to reduce the disparity” between Tan’s sentence and that of another man arrested in the same Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) operation, who ultimately received a non-capital sentence. 

Clemency in Singapore is an extraordinary remedy, exercised sparingly as an act of executive grace. 

Under the Constitution, the President may, on the advice of Cabinet, pardon, reprieve or commute a sentence, exercised sparingly in exceptional cases where extenuating circumstances justify a departure from the strict application of the law. 

The last time clemency was granted to a death row inmate before Tan was in 1998, when President Ong Teng Cheong commuted the sentence of Mathavakannan Kalimuthu, a 19-year-old convicted of murder, to life imprisonment. That remains the last known case where a capital sentence was set aside. 

In 2018, then President Halimah Yacob granted clemency to the teenage accomplice of Anthony Ler, who had been detained indefinitely at the President’s pleasure after participating in Ler’s wife’s murder. This, however, was not a death penalty case, as the youth had been spared the gallows because of his age. 

Tan’s commutation in 2025 is therefore the 1st clemency granted to a death row inmate in 27 years. 

Speaking to TOC, human rights lawyer M Ravi said that the fact there has been only one clemency in nearly three decades demonstrates how tightly restricted the use of this power is. 

He added that there should not be a clamp on clemency, as historically it marks the point where mercy begins once the legal process ends ensuring that the harshness of the mandatory death sentence is mitigated. 

At first glance, Tan’s commutation might seem an act of fairness, correcting unequal outcomes. 

Yet a closer look at the facts, the legal framework, and past capital cases shows that the reasoning is far more troubling. Instead of clarifying how mercy is applied, this decision exposes deeper inconsistencies in Singapore’s clemency process. 

Case 1: Tristan Tan Yi Rui — full intent, active role

Arrest: 27 September 2018 in Tampines during a CNB operation.

Facts: Driving a white Volkswagen with another man in the passenger seat. CNB officers recovered 499g crystalline substance later analysed to contain at least 337.6g methamphetamine.

Evidence:

Used alias “Travis” to arrange drug transaction with supplier “Hari”.

Sole user of mobile phone TT-HP1 containing incriminating chats and personal messages.

Messages to fiancée on arrest day included: “dealing right now… heart thumping harder n faster” — showing awareness of drug-related activity.

DNA found on the inner drug packaging.

Court finding: Not a mere courier; no Certificate of Substantive Assistance issued; guilty with full knowledge and intent.

Sentence: Mandatory death penalty imposed in 2023.

Clemency basis: Disparity with co-accused’s non-capital sentence. 

Case 2: Muhammad Hakam bin Suliman — same operation, different charge

Arrest: Same CNB operation as Tan in September 2018.

Drugs: Originally faced a charge of at least 6,639.15g of cannabis mixture — a capital amount.

Prosecutorial decision: The Prosecution later applied to withdraw that charge and proceeded instead with 499.99g of cannabis — just under the 500g capital threshold. The court ordered a discharge amounting to an acquittal for the original capital charge.

Likely legal context: This reflected the impact of the Saravanan Chandaran case, which barred dual charges of cannabis and cannabis mixture from the same block of plant matter.

Outcome: Life imprisonment and caning.

Note: While MHA did not disclose the identity of the co-accused referred to in Tan’s clemency decision, the High Court judgment makes it clear that this was Muhammad Hakam, who had been arrested in the same vehicle as Tan during the CNB operation. 

Here lies the core problem. The so-called “sentencing disparity” between Hakam and Tan was not the outcome of judicial evaluation of different levels of culpability. 

It was the outcome of a prosecutorial choice about which charge to pursue. By reducing Hakam’s charge below the capital threshold, the prosecution ensured he could never face death, while Tan was exposed to the full force of the mandatory regime. 

Opaque discretion: the Ramalingam principle

In Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General, the Court of Appeal held that the Attorney-General has complete discretion to decide which charges to bring, and that the courts cannot compel the AGC to give reasons for its charging decisions. Unless there is proof of bad faith or unconstitutionality, prosecutorial discretion is non-reviewable. 

This means that in cases like Hakam’s, where a capital charge was dropped in favour of a non-capital one, no explanation is required. 

Here lies the core problem. The so-called “sentencing disparity” between Hakam and Tan was not the outcome of judicial evaluation of different levels of culpability. It was the outcome of a prosecutorial choice about which charge to pursue. 

By reducing Hakam’s charge below the capital threshold, the prosecution ensured he could never face death, while Tan was exposed to the full force of the mandatory regime. 

Case 3: Nagaenthran K. Dharmalingam — intellectual disability, no clemency

Arrest: 22 April 2009 at Woodlands Checkpoint.

Drugs: 42.72g heroin — nearly triple the 15g capital threshold.

Medical evidence: IQ of 69 (prosecution’s psychiatrist), mild ADHD, impaired executive functioning, borderline intellectual disability.

Court: Accepted the medical findings but concluded that “borderline intellectual functioning” was insufficient to meet the Misuse of Drugs Act definition of “abnormality of mind” for sentencing discretion.

International norms: UN General Assembly resolutions, the European Union, and multiple foreign courts prohibit executing persons with intellectual disabilities.

Outcome: No COC issued; all appeals dismissed; clemency petition rejected; executed in 2022.

The contradiction exposed

In Tan’s case, clemency was applied to address disparity between co-accused — but that disparity was not a reflection of justice being unevenly applied by the courts. It was created upstream, by prosecutorial discretion exercised behind closed doors, with no obligation to justify its basis. 

In Nagaenthran’s case, there was no co-accused disparity at all. What existed instead was a compelling humanitarian ground recognised under international law: his intellectual disability, which the courts themselves acknowledged. Yet mercy was denied. 

This reveals a troubling hierarchy: parity between co-accused, even when manufactured by opaque prosecutorial choices, appears to outweigh intellectual disability as a ground for mercy. 

More troubling still is the circularity. The prosecution’s choice of charges determines whether an accused is exposed to death or life imprisonment. 

When this choice creates disparity between co-accused, the Cabinet — advised by the very same institution, the AGC — then invokes clemency to “correct” the problem. Clemency thus ends up patching disparities that the State itself produced, raising serious questions about coherence and accountability. 

What Malaysia has done differently

The contrast becomes even starker when compared to Malaysia’s recent reforms. In 2023, Malaysia passed the Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Bill, giving judges discretion to consider all circumstances of the offence and the offender before deciding on a death sentence or a prison term of up to 40 years. 

This reform replaced the automatic death penalty for 11 offences — including drug trafficking — with a system that allows courts to weigh mitigating factors such as mental capacity, role in the offence, and personal background. 

It directly addresses the problem at the heart of Singapore’s clemency paradox: in Malaysia, the question of whether an offender like Tan or Nagaenthran should be executed would no longer be predetermined by prosecutorial charging decisions. 

Instead, the court itself could decide a proportionate sentence based on the facts and circumstances, without requiring executive intervention through clemency. 

By removing the rigid constraints of mandatory sentencing, Malaysia has ensured that factors like intellectual disability are considered before a death sentence is imposed. 

In Singapore, by contrast, the law still ties judicial hands in capital drug cases unless narrow exceptions apply, leaving clemency as the only relief — a relief that, as these cases show, is applied inconsistently and without transparent principles. 

The principle at stake

This is not a call for Tristan Tan to be executed. Clemency remains a vital safeguard. But when it is used to resolve disparities caused by prosecutorial choices while refusing mercy to offenders with intellectual disabilities, it risks appearing arbitrary and illogical. 

After years without a clemency grant in a capital case, the Cabinet’s reasoning in Tan’s case highlights the need for clear, transparent, and principled criteria. 

When the State holds the power of life and death, the process must not only be fair — it must be seen to be fair.

Source: The Online Citizen, Terry Xu, Opinion, August 17, 2025

"One is absolutely sickened, not by the crimes that the wicked have committed,
but by the punishments that the good have inflicted."

— Oscar Wilde