California Supreme Court Overturns Death Sentence in Gang Murder Case Due to Improper Juror Removal

In a rare ruling with broad implications for jury deliberations and the death penalty in California, the California Supreme Court on April 3, 2025, reversed the murder convictions and death sentence of Timothy Joseph McGhee, a reputed gang leader convicted of multiple homicides and attempted murders in Los Angeles.

Writing for a unanimous court in People v. McGhee (S169750), Justice Goodwin Liu found that the trial court had committed a “clear abuse of discretion” by improperly removing a dissenting juror during guilt-phase deliberations, undermining the defendant’s constitutional right to a unanimous jury.

The ruling vacates the entire judgment and remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings, leaving open the possibility of a retrial. The Court ruled that it did not consider McGhee’s other claims, including one brought under the California Racial Justice Act, which he may still raise if the prosecution seeks the death penalty again .

McGhee, described by prosecutors as a high-ranking member of the Toonerville street gang, was convicted of three first-degree murders and four attempted murders stemming from five separate gang-related shootings between 1997 and 2001. The trial involved testimony from numerous gang members, jailhouse informants, and eyewitnesses—many of whom had criminal records or had received benefits for their cooperation.

Despite the severity of the charges and an earlier mistrial in the penalty phase, a second jury imposed the death penalty. But the Supreme Court found that a critical flaw during deliberations in the first phase of trial invalidated the entire verdict.

Central to the Court’s decision was the dismissal of Juror No. 5, who was removed during guilt-phase deliberations after two other jurors sent a note alleging that he was biased and unwilling to deliberate. The trial judge interviewed the jurors individually—excluding Juror No. 5 until after forming a tentative ruling to dismiss him—and ultimately concluded that the juror had an anti-police bias and was refusing to participate in discussions.

However, Justice Liu wrote that the “record does not manifestly support either basis” for removal. “[T]he court’s ruling therefore was an abuse of discretion.”

The decision found that disagreement with fellow jurors or skepticism of prosecution witnesses, even early in deliberations, is not grounds for discharge.

“Jurors are supposed to share their own evaluations of the credibility of witnesses and the strength of the evidence,” Liu wrote. “That a given juror may reach a different conclusion on these questions from those espoused by other jurors… does not render the juror unfit.”

According to multiple jurors, Juror No. 5 questioned the credibility of key prosecution witnesses, citing their criminal records, motives for testifying, and inconsistencies in their accounts. He expressed doubt about the plausibility of certain events and suggested that some testimonies appeared coached. He also said he didn’t trust the police “in this case,” rather than as a general rule.

The Court found that Juror No. 5’s disbelief was “not based on ideas unconnected to the evidence” and that many of his concerns were directly supported by trial testimony. For example, a police informant had a pending charge for impersonating an officer and may have faced pressure to testify. Another witness admitted to being on methamphetamine during a shooting and initially gave conflicting accounts .

The jury had been instructed that prior convictions or deals with the prosecution could impact credibility but did not automatically disqualify a witness’s testimony—a standard that Juror No. 5 appeared to apply appropriately.

The Court concluded, “We cannot say that the record shows to a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 5 exhibited an improper bias against law enforcement or the prosecution warranting his removal.”

The Court expressed deep concern with how the trial court conducted its inquiry into juror misconduct. Justice Liu wrote that trial courts should conduct as limited an inquiry as possible when deliberations are ongoing “to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations.”

In McGhee’s case, the judge questioned nearly all jurors except Juror No. 5 before deciding to dismiss him. The Court noted that the judge could have instead reinstructed the jury on their duties or spoken first with Juror No. 5 to give him an opportunity to respond to the allegations .

Although some jurors described Juror No. 5 as “not making sense” or “not rational,” the same jurors also reported his stated reasons for disbelieving the prosecution’s witnesses. “The complaining jurors may have found those reasons unpersuasive, but their testimony undercuts the notion that Juror No. 5 had no reasons, other than anti-prosecution bias,” the Court wrote .

The Supreme Court’s reversal reinforces a longstanding principle in California law: trial judges must exercise “great caution” when removing a seated juror.

As the Court wrote, “A court’s intervention may upset the delicate balance of deliberations. The requirement of a unanimous criminal verdict is an important safeguard, long recognized in American jurisprudence” .

Even if a juror appears to be “hard-headed” or reluctant to change their mind, the Court noted that such conduct is not only expected but protected within the deliberative process. Juror No. 5 had reportedly told fellow jurors he was “not going to change [his] mind but would try to convince others,” a stance the Court said was well within his rights .

In a final note, the Court explicitly stated that it had not reached other claims raised by McGhee, including a challenge under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. That law prohibits racial bias in charging and sentencing decisions and provides mechanisms to raise such claims.

“He remains free to raise that claim if the prosecution elects to retry McGhee and seeks a judgment of death,” the opinion concluded .

The ruling in People v. McGhee reaffirms the core constitutional rights of criminal defendants, particularly in capital cases, and sends a clear message to trial courts: skepticism, dissent, or even stubbornness from a juror is not misconduct—it is a protected part of the deliberative process.

As Justice Liu wrote, “Conscientious jurors may come to different conclusions. It is not the province of trial or reviewing courts to substitute their logic for that of jurors to whom credibility decisions are entrusted.”

It is unclear whether McGhee will face another trial. The California Supreme Court has vacated his conviction and death sentence, remanding the case back to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

Source: davisvanguard.org, David Greenwald, April 4, 2025

"One is absolutely sickened, not by the crimes that the wicked have committed,
but by the punishments that the good have inflicted."

— Oscar Wilde